How can supposedly professional politicians be so shockingly bad at politics?

House Democrats have decided to make a great show of refusing to support the President's deal on extending the Bush tax cuts.  It is difficult to understand why any remotely competent politician would take on such a clearly untenable position.  The inevitable climb down is clearly going to be deeply humiliating. At the present time Democrats currently have two plausible alternatives:

1. Pass, however grudgingly, the President's tax deal
2. Dig their heals in and ensure that:
   1. The President is severely damaged (What use is a President who can't even rally his own party?)
   2. Democrats take the blame for everyone's taxes going (Can't avoid that when you willfully torpedo a bipartisan deal)
   3. The replacement deal to extend the Bush tax cuts will be done by the next Congress, in which Democrats will have even less leverage (Because that's what happens when you lose the house)

Since most Democrats are not actually certifiable, it is only a matter of time before they back down and take option 1. There are a fair number of people who seem to believe that, if they stick to their guns, house Democrats will somehow be able to negotiate a better deal.  This is pure fantasy.  The Democrats have precisely zero leverage in this situation.  Republicans already have a deal they like.  If the Democrats refuse to get on board they will be more than happy to blame Democrats for a tax hike, then force an even better deal next year. Since all of the above is obvious to pretty much everyone involved, the political tactics being employed by house Democrats seem thoroughly mystifying. The only explanation that makes sense is that this little piece of political theater is aimed, not at the general public, but at Democratic primary voters. Democrats who are losing their seats are taking the opportunity to position themselves as true guardians of the faith, just in case they want to run in 2012.  While those Democrats who survived the recent slaughter certainly don't want to open themselves to a potential primary challenge from the left by being seen as too willing support a deal that the folks who vote in Democratic primaries aren't too fond of. Everyone knows a climb down is coming, but precisely which Democrats are held responsible for this humiliation by the party faithful may have a big influence on a lot of Democratic careers.

Directorial Debut

A Dose of Reality for Fiscal Conservatives

It appears that Messers. Erskine and Bowles are having some difficulty rounding up support from either Republicans or Democrats for their deficit reduction proposal. This was entirely predictable, but very disheartening for those of us who would like to see the deficit reduced mainly through expenditure control.  What Republicans have apparently failed to grasp is that time is not on the side of fiscal conservatives.  As this insightful article points out, the longer we wait the more inevitable tax increases become:

To understand the stakes facing fiscal conservatives, one must appreciate how demographics, program indexing methods and political realities combine to stack the deck against them. By bipartisan consensus, we won't cut the benefits of those already in retirement; we won't send a $2000 check to an 85-year-old widow in January and then cut it back to $1600 in February. Both parties (including the most conservative members) repeatedly reaffirm their dedication to this principle. As a result, with each new class of retirees there is a new set of politically inviolate benefit obligations. Moreover, due to the wage-indexation of the initial benefit formula, the minimum threshold of politically acceptable future benefits rises with each subsequent class of retirees. So, with each year of delay the share of the problem eventually solved by tax increases inevitably rises.* Well before 2037, unless we cut benefits for those already retired, a tax increase could not be avoided even if the entirety of payments to new beneficiaries were shut off. Thus, if action is delayed for several years, virtually all of the "solution" will consist of tax increases. Our potential success in constraining the growth of taxpayer burdens therefore depends largely on when a solution is enacted. It is not so simple as deciding a particular solution is faulty, tearing it up, and trying again in a few years on the hope that conservatives' political position will then be stronger. Such a strategy naively ignores demographic realities. Enacting Simpson-Bowles by contrast would allow conservatives to lock in constraints upon cost growth that simply will not be achievable under a delayed solution.

Republicans may not actually be serious about deficit reduction.  Or they may be calculating that they will be able to negotiate a better deal next year. If the latter is true they are making a serious gamble.  The election largely wiped out Democratic moderates.  The Democrats who remain are likely to be more committed to closing the fiscal gap with new taxes, and very much aware that they only need to stall in order to get their way. The Republicans have the opportunity right now to shape the deficit debate by endorsing some variant of the 'bi-partisan' Erskine-Bowles plan.  If they instead try and push a Republican plan next year the chances of getting a deal drop to near zero.  Unfortunately for the country, failure to get a deal is effectively the same as voting for higher taxes. * Reference to a chart showing projected increase in Social Security beneficiaries has been omitted from the quote

Islamic Center Outrage

I'm curious about how far an Islamic center needs to be from Ground Zero to be acceptable.

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A Succinct Summary of US Health Care Policy

(Paraphrased from the comments on this blog post) "I hope there's a money tree somewhere to pay for all of this." "There used to be a money tree, but the magic pony ate it." "Don't worry about the magic pony.  It may eat money trees, but it craps pure un-rationed efficient high-quality government health care for every American."

Insight from the Sweet Science

This is from a fascinating article on the impact the taxman has had on boxing:

The 1950s was the era of the 90 percent top marginal tax rate, and by the end of that decade live gate receipts for top championship fights were supplemented by the proceeds from closed circuit telecasts to movie theaters. A second fight in one tax year would yield very little additional income, hardly worth the risk of losing the title. And so, the three fights between Floyd Patterson and Ingemar Johansson stretched over three years (1959-1961); the two between Patterson and Sonny Liston over two years (1962-1963), as was also true for the two bouts between Liston and Cassius Clay (Muhammad Ali) (1964-1965). Then, the Tax Reform Act of 1964 cut the top marginal tax rate to 70 percent effective in 1965. The result: two heavyweight title fights in 1965, and five in 1966. You can look it up.

The lesson can be summed up in two words - INCENTIVES MATTER

A huge sigh of relief.......

Now that health reform (at least in its current form) is more or less dead, it is time to ask who is more relieved:

1. The consumers and taxpayers saved from a disastrous attempt at reform
2. The Democratic caucus which has been saved from having to pass it's own disastrous attempt at reform

Scott Brown may just have saved a lot of Democratic political careers.